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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Utah Court of Appeals has juri sdi ction pi irsuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) and the order of the Utah Supreme Court
transferring this cases, to the Court of Appeals.
This is an appeal from a judgment based on ai 1 order granting
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment against Appellant.

STATEMENT 05 ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Was Respondent entitled to summary judgment based upon
the record before the Court at the time it submitted its motion
for summary judgment for decision?

In particular, did that record

establish that there was no genuine issue of material fact
regardi rig the agency o f Defendant Gary I .„ Bentley to act for
Defendant S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc. at the time of an auction
sale of Respondent's personal property?
2.

Did Appe] 3 ai it pr oper] y oppose Respondent's motion for

summary judgment so as to create a genuine issue of material fact?
a

Was Appellant entitled to rely on its denials of

Respondent's request • for admission to create a fact issue?
b

Were Appellant's second memorandum in opposition to

the motion for summary judgment, and the affidavits that
accompanied i t, filed timely so as to become par t of the record on.
which the motion for summary judgment could be decided?
Was the out-of-court statement by Frank Trunzo
(that Bentley was solely responsible for the auction), reported in
the affidavit of Harold L. Petersen, an admission by a party1

opponent within the meaning of Rule 801(d)(2), Utah Rules of
Evidence, and hence admissible evidence?
3.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying

Appellant's attorney's oral request, unsupported by any affidavit,
to apply Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to deny
Respondent's motion for summary judgment?

DETERMINATIVE RULES
Rule 36, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: See Addendum A.
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: See Addendum B.
Rule 801(d)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence:
Statements which are not hearsay.
if:
•

A statement is not hearsay

• • •

(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered
against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his
individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement
of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement
by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope
of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the
relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Rule 4-501(2), Utah Code of Judicial Administration:
The responding party shall file and serve upon all parties
within ten (10) days after service of a motion, but no later
than five (5) days before the date of hearing, a statement
[sic] answering points and authorities and counteraffidavits.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS,
AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW

Respondent The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Company ("Mountain Bell") 1 filed this action on January 28, 1988,
to recover the net proceeds ($47,705.64) of an auction of its
vehicles and equipment conducted by Defendants Gary L. Bentley
("Bentley") and/or S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc. ("the Trunzo
Company")2 pursuant to a written contract between Mountain Bell
and the Trunzo Company (R. 2-28).

It also sought to recover

against Appellant Old Republic Insurance Company ("Old Republic")
as surety on an auctioneer's license bond issued in favor of
Mountain Bell as obligee, with the Trunzo Company as principal, in
the penal amount of $45,000.00 (R. 2-28).
Although all defendants were served with process (R. 29-41,
43-45), only Old Republic filed an answer (R. 61-67); accordingly,
default judgments were entered against Bentley (R. 46-47) and the
Trunzo Company (R. 55-56).
Discovery consisted principally of a set of interrogatories
1

At all times material to this action, Appellant did
business under the assumed name "Mountain Bell." In August, 1988,
the assumed name was changed to "U S WEST Communications."
However, for purposes of this case, the former name "Mountain
Bell" will be used to maintain consistency with the use of that
name in the record.
2

To distinguish between Defendant S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers,
Inc., a Utah corporation, and its president, Frank Trunzo, in this
brief, the corporation will be referred to as "the Trunzo
Company," and the president will be referred to as "Frank Trunzo."
References in the record to "Trunzo" may mean either the Trunzo
Company or Frank Trunzo, depending on the context.
3

and request for production of documents served by Old Republic on
Mountain Bell on or about July 7, 1988 (R. 74-77), and a set of
requests for admission, interrogatories, and request for
production of documents served by Mountain Bell on each of the
defendants on or about July 15, 1988 (R. 88-90, 117-46, 212-36,
237-61).

Although Mountain Bell responded to Old Republic's

discovery request (R. 94), no defendant responded to Mountain
Bell's request.
On November 18, 1988, Mountain Bell filed a motion for
summary judgment against Old Republic, based in part on the
failure to respond to the requests for admission (R. 102-16).

The

motion was also supported by the affidavits of Walter Williams
(R. 149-84) and Josephine Briggs (R. 95-101).

In response to the

motion, on November 29, 1988, Old Republic served its responses to
Mountain Bell's request for admissions (R. 185-86), and filed a
motion to withdraw or amend the admissions (R. 193-95, 187-92) and
a memorandum in opposition to Mountain Bell's motion for summary
judgment (R. 196-99), but failed to file any opposing affidavit.
Although Mountain Bell filed a memorandum in opposition to
Old Republic's motion to withdraw admissions (R. 203-61) and a
motion to strike the responses to Mountain Bell's requests
(R. 201-02) on December 5, 1988,3 the district court, sua sponte,
had already entered a minute entry on the same date granting Old

J

Mountain Bell also filed a reply memorandum (R. 272-88) and
a request to submit its motion for summary judgment for decision
(R. 267-69), along with a supplemental affidavit of Walter
Williams (R. 262-66), on the same date.
4

Republic's motion to withdraw the admissions and permitting
Mountain Bell to "re-notice" its summary judgment motion following
the amendment of the response to Mountain Bell's admissions
(R. 200, 289, 290, 293-94).
On December 12, 1988, Mountain Bell filed a renewed request
to submit its motion for summary judgment for decision (R. 29192).

On December 27, 1988, Old Republic filed a second memorandum

in opposition to that motion (R. 299-319), together with the
affidavits of Myrel G. Mitchell (R. 314-16) and Harold L.
Petersen (R. 317-19, 323-26).4

Mountain Bell filed a motion to

strike the memorandum and affidavits on December 28, 1988
(R. 327-29).
Mountain Bell's motion for summary judgment was argued
January 23, 1989. At the hearing, Old Republic's counsel orally
requested the court to deny Mountain Bell's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that it had been unable to locate Frank
Trunzo, the president of the Trunzo Company (Tr. 17), but did not
then or thereafter submit any affidavit to establish that fact.
Following the oral argument, the court granted Mountain Bell's
motion for summary judgment from the bench (R. 341, Tr. 18).
Judgment was entered accordingly on February 6, 1989 (R. 347-48).
Old Republic filed its notice of appeal on March 6, 1989
(R. 351-52).

The affidavit of Harold Petersen is attached as Addendum D.
5

B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The procedural facts that are important to this appeal are
set forth in the preceding section.

Since the principal issues in

this appeal revolve around what evidence was properly part of the
record on which Mountain Bell's motion for summary judgment was
based, this section will distinguish between the facts that it
contends were properly established, and the additional facts that
Old Republic has asserted but which Mountain Bell contends should
not have been considered by the trial court.
At the time Mountain Bell resubmitted its motion for summary
judgment for decision (the time for submission of opposing
memoranda and affidavits having expired), the affidavits then on
file5 established the following pertinent facts:6
1.

Mountain Bell had used the auctioneer services of the

Trunzo Company, pursuant to a written contract, exclusively since
1982, including at least 10 auctions involving over $400,000.00
worth of equipment (Williams Aff. ft 3, R. 150, 155-70; Williams
Supp. Aff. f 6, R. 264). In all of the auctions since September,
5

Those affidavits consist of the original and supplemental
affidavits of Walter Williams (R. 149-84, 262-66) and the
affidavit of Josephine Briggs (R. 95-101), but do not include the
affidavits of Harold Peterson (R. 323-26) and Myrel Mitchell
(R. 314-16), which were filed at least fifteen days after Mountain
Bell re-noticed its motion for decision (R. 291-92).
6

Since the only substantive issue addressed by Old Republic
in this appeal is the agency of Bentley to act for the Trunzo
Company in the October 10, 1987 auction, only those facts that
relate directly to that issue will be set forth in the text. Old
Republic has apparently conceded that if Bentley is held to be the
agent of the Trunzo Company, it is liable on the auctioneer's
license bond that it, as surety, issued in favor of Mountain Bell,
as obligee, with the Trunzo Company as principal.
6

1984, Bentley acted as the representative of the Trunzo Company
(Williams Aff. f 9, R. 151; Williams Supp. Aff. ff 4-6, R. 26364).

Mountain Bell's representative made all arrangements for the

auctions through Bentley, and Bentley personally assisted in
picking up the items to be auctioned and in conducting the
auctions (Williams Supp. Aff. 1 4, R. 263). He also directed
other employees of the Trunzo Company in connection with those
auctions, executed receipts on behalf of the Trunzo Company,
arranged for advertisements and other publicity for the auctions,
and arranged for the accounting and record keeping with respect to
the last two auctions (Williams Supp. Aff. f 4, R. 263).
2.

Not only did Bentley tell Mountain Bell's representative

that he was the vice-president of the Trunzo Company7 (Williams
Supp. Aff. f 5, R. 263), but Frank Trunzo, the president of the
Trunzo Company, made like representations (Williams Supp. Aff.
f 7, R. 264). Furthermore, although Frank Trunzo met with the
Mountain Bell representative on numerous occasions during the
period from 1984 through 1987, he never indicated that Bentley was
not authorized to arrange auctions for the Trunzo Company,
although he obviously knew that Bentley was doing so (Williams
Supp. Aff. f 7, R. 264-65).
3.

Bentley executed a license bond on behalf of the Trunzo

Company, as principal, in favor of Mountain Bell, as obligee,
which was countersigned by Old Republic's authorized agent, Myrel
7

Affidavits from other actions pending in the Third District
Court confirmed that Bentley held himself out as a vice president
of the Trunzo Company (R. 280-88).
7

G. Mitchell (Williams Aff. 1 8, R. 151, 181-82).
4.

With respect to the auction in question, which was held

on October 10, 1987, Mountain Bell's representative contacted
Bentley, representing the Trunzo Company, and requested him to
pick up the items to be auctioned, which he did (Williams Aff.
ff 10, 11, R. 151). Not only did Bentley participate in
conducting the auction, but Frank Trunzo did so as well (Williams
Aff. ff 13-14, R. 152). The auction was held at the auction yard
of the Trunzo Company, at which a sign appeared reading "S.F.
Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc." (Williams Aff. f 13, R. 152).
5.

Both Bentley and Frank Trunzo assured Mountain Bell's

representative that the Trunzo Company would conduct the auction,
and that no sale or disposition of the Trunzo Company's assets
would occur until after the auction (Williams Aff. % 12,
R. 151-52).
6.

The unanswered requests for admission served on Bentley

(R. 237-61) and the Trunzo Company (R. 212-236) establish
conclusively, as to those parties, that Bentley was an officer and
agent of the Trunzo Company, acting within the scope of his
authority, when he conducted the auction of Mountain Bell vehicles
and equipment on October 10, 1987 (R. 219-20, 244-45).
With respect to Bentley's agency, the late-filed memorandum,
attachment,8 and affidavits submitted by Old Republic, if
8

Attached to the memorandum was a copy of a purported
contract of sale of some of the Trunzo Company's assets to
Bentley. Old Republic did not provide any affidavit to
authenticate the document, even after Mountain Bell moved to
strike it for lack of authentication under Rule 901, Utah R. Evid.
8

considered, would tend to establish only the following:
A.

The Trunzo Company, Frank Trunzo, and Bentley entered an

agreement dated July 8, 1987, for the sale of some, but not all,
of the Trunzo Company's assets (R. 299, 303-13).

Those assets did

not include the Trunzo Company's rights under the contract with
Mountain Bell9 (R. 303-04).

There is no evidence that the sale

was ever completed, nor that any attempt was made to obtain
Mountain Bell's consent to assign the auction contract to Bentley.
B.

Frank Trunzo told Harold Peterson, Old Republic's first

attorney of record in this case, that "following the sale of the
S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc. assets to Bentley, Bentley was not
authorized to act as an agent for S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers."10
(Peterson Aff. f 5, R. 324) . There is no indication whether Frank
Trunzo told Mr. Peterson when or whether the sale was ever
completed.
C.

Frank Trunzo also told Harold Peterson that Trunzo had

informed Mountain Bell's representative, Walter Williams, that
"Mr. Trunzo was selling his business to Gary Bentley and further
that Bentley was solely responsible for the October 10, 1987,
auction where Mountain Bell's equipment was allegedly auctioned."
9

Only "assignable" auction contracts were to be purchased by
Bentley (R. 303). Mountain Bell's contract with the Trunzo
Company specifically prohibited assignment without the prior
written consent of Mountain Bell (R. 163). There is no evidence
that the Trunzo Company sought to assign the Mountain Bell
contract to Bentley, much less that Mountain Bell consented to
such an assignment.
10

The agreement provided for the sale to be completed on
July 8, 1988, some nine months after the auction of October 10,
1987 (R. 304-05).
9

(Peterson Aff. If 6, R. 324). Again, there is no indication that
Frank Trunzo told Mr. Peterson when or if the sale was completed,
nor does the statement indicate whether Frank Trunzo made the
alleged statement to Mountain Bell's agent before or after the
auction.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
1.

The record properly before the court established Mountain

Bell's right to summary judgment.

The Rule 36 constructive

admissions of the Trunzo Company and Bentley conclusively
established that Bentley was the Trunzo Company's agent, acting
within the scope of his authority, when he conducted the auction
in question.

Williams' affidavits also establish both actual and

apparent agency, by showing a long course of dealing with Bentley
as the Trunzo Company's agent, representations by both the Trunzo
Company and Bentley that he was an agent, and that Frank Trunzo,
the Trunzo Company's president, participated with Bentley in the
auction in question, which was conducted on the premises of the
Trunzo Company.
2.

Old Republic's opposition to the motion for summary

judgment was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact.

Reliance on denials of requests for admission is

insufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment.

The

affidavits filed by Old Republic were not timely, and no excuse
was offered for their tardiness, nor was leave sought to permit
them to be filed late or to be considered.
10

Even if considered,

the affidavit of Harold Peterson does not raise a question of
fact, because the out-of-court statement of Frank Trunzo, reported
in the affidavit, is inadmissible hearsay.

It does not constitute

an admission by a party-opponent because it was not offered
against the declarant.
3.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting

Old Republic's verbal request to deny summary judgment on the
basis of Rule 56(f), where no affidavit was filed stating the
reasons why Old Republic could not procure counter-affidavits, and
where Old Republic was not pursuing further discovery in the case.

ARGUMENT
I.

MOUNTAIN BELL PROPERLY ESTABLISHED THE AGENCY OF BENTLEY
TO ACT FOR THE TRUNZO COMPANY.

Under agency law, an agent can make its principal responsible
for the agent's actions if the agent is acting pursuant to either
actual or apparent authority.
of Agency §§ 26, 27 (1958).
implied.

See generally Restatement (Second)

Actual authority may be express or

Id. at § 7, comment c.

The admissible evidence properly

before the court at the time Mountain Bell re-noticed its motion
for summary judgment for decision established that Bentley had
both actual and apparent authority from the Trunzo Company to
conduct the auction of October 10, 1987.
A.

Bentley had actual authority.

The evidence of Bentley's actual authority consisted of the
following: (1) the unanswered requests for admission to Bentley

11

and the Trunzo Company,11 and (2) the original and supplemental
affidavits of Walter Williams, Mountain Bell's representative12
(Re 212-36, 237-61, 149-84, 262-66).

The requests for admission

establish conclusively, as to Bentley and the Trunzo Company, that
Bentley had actual agency to bind the Trunzo Company.

The

Williams affidavits establish that a long course of dealing
existed between Mountain Bell and the Trunzo Company, with Bentley
consistently acting as the Trunzo Company's agent; that Frank
Trunzo, the undisputed president of the Trunzo Compciny,
represented to Mountain Bell's agent that Bentley was authorized
to conduct auctions on behalf of the Trunzo Company; and that
Frank Trunzo also participated with Bentley in conducting the
October 10, 1987 auction, which was held at the Trunzo Company's
auction yard, where a sign identifying the Trunzo Company was
prominently displayed.
11

The requests that are pertinent to the agency issue are as
follows:
"13. Admit that Gary L. Bentley was authorized by Trunzo
[the Trunzo Company] to sign the license bond on behalf of Trunzo.
14. Admit that Bentley signed the license bond on behalf of
Trunzo.
. . . .

18. Admit that in conducting an auction of Mountain Bell
vehicles and equipment on or about October 10, 1987, Bentley acted
as an agent of Trunzo.
19. Admit that in conducting an auction of Mountain Bell
vehicles and equipment on or about October 10, 1987, Bentley acted
within the scope of his authority as an agent of Trunzo.
20. Admit that during the discovery period, Bentley was an
officer of Trunzo.
21. Admit that during the time Bentley was an officer of
Trunzo, he had authority to conduct auctions on behalf of Trunzo."
(R. 219-20, 244-45).
12

The affidavits of Walter Williams are attached hereto as
Addendum C.
12

The unanswered requests for admission propounded to the
Trunzo Company and to Bentley created a judicial admission by
those parties that Bentley was acting as the Trunzo Company's
agent at the time of the auction.13

"This has the effect of

withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need
for proof of fact." D. McCormick, Law of Evidence § 262 (1972).
A judicial admission is distinct from an evidential admission.
"The judicial admission, unless it should be allowed by the court
to be withdrawn, is conclusive, whereas the evidential admission
is not conclusive . . . ."

Id.

Rule 36(b) provides that "[a]ny

matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless
the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the
admission." While Rule 36 admissions are only binding against the
parties to whom they were directed, e.g., Riberalass v. TechniGlass Industries, Inc., 811 F.2d 565, 566 (11th Cir. 1987); In re
Leonetti, 28 B.R. 1003, 1009 (E.D. Pa. 1983), and hence are not
conclusively binding on Old Republic, they do prevent the Trunzo
Company and Bentley from contradicting the matters admitted.
Furthermore, Rule 36 admissions may be used to support a motion
1J

Rule 36(a) permits requests for admission to be served
"upon any other party." A defaulted party is nonetheless a party.
See Rule 55(a), Utah R. Civ. Proc. Therefore, Mountain Bell was
entitled to serve requests for admission upon the Trunzo Company
and Bentley, even though default had been entered against them.
Rule 36(a) also provides:
The matter is admitted unless, within thirty days after
service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time
as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is
directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a
written answer or objection addressed to the matter . . . .
Therefore, the unanswered requests to the Trunzo Company and
Bentley were deemed admitted.
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for summary judgment.

See Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. Proc.; Schmitt

v. Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979).

Therefore, as far as the

Trunzo Company and Bentley were concerned, it is conclusively
established that agency existed.

Since those parties constitute

both the principal and the agent, their admissions constitute
powerful evidence of the agency, even as to Old Republic.
Additional evidence also establishes that Bentley had actual
authority from the Trunzo Company.

The Utah Supreme Court has

stated:
''The actual authority of an agent may be implied from the
words and conduct of the parties and the facts and
circumstances attending the transaction in question . . . .
Whenever the performance of certain business is confided to
an agent, such authority carries with it, by implication,
authority to do collateral acts which are the natural and
ordinary incidents of the main act or business authorized."
Bowen v. 01sen, 576 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1978).

In the present

case, Walter Williams' affidavits establish that the Trunzo
Company had entrusted Bentley with authority to conduct and
perform all auctions of Mountain Bell property for over three
years.

The Trunzo Company does not dispute that Bentley was an

authorized agent for previous auctions, and the affidavit of
Walter Williams, together with the admissions of the Trunzo
Company, establish that actual authority existed for the auction
in question.
B.

Bentley had apparent authority.

The evidence before the court also established that Bentley
had apparent authority.

Apparent authority is shown by the

conduct of the principal approving or ratifying the acts of the
14

agent.

See Zion's First National Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762

P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1988).

Frank Trunzo, as president of the

Trunzo Company, created such an appearance of things that Mountain
Bell could reasonably believe that Bentley had apparent authority
to act for and on behalf of the Trunzo Company.

Frank Trunzo knew

that Bentley was conducting the auctions and allowed him to do so.
His participation with Bentley in selling Mountain Bell's vehicles
in the October 10, 1987 auction makes it reasonable to conclude
that Bentley had proper authority.

Furthermore, Frank Trunzo

specifically told Mountain Bell's representative that the October
10, 1987 auction would be conducted by the Trunzo Company
(R. 152). Thus the present case is distinguishable from the case
cited by Old Republic.

In City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-

Plymouthf 672 P.2d 89 (Utah 1983), the principal had absolutely no
knowledge that his employees were charging personal supplies to
the company's open account; hence there was no basis for finding
apparent authority.
The case of Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982),
cited by Old Republic, which provides that one who deals with an
agent has the responsibility to ascertain the agent's authority,
is also inapplicable.

The lengthy course of dealings between

Mountain Bell and Trunzo is adequate proof that Mountain Bell had
ascertained the question of Bentley's authority.

A course of

dealing which recognizes a person's agency is evidence of the
agency relationship.

See e.g., O'Dav v. George Arakelian Farms,

Inc., 540 P.2d 197, 199 (Ariz. App. 1975); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.
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v. Eniay Chemical Co., 316 A.2d 219, 222 (Del. 1974); Fox v.
Morse. 96 N.W.2d 637, 640 (Minn. 1959).
Once apparent authority has been established, it continues as
to a third party until the third party is put on notice that the
agent's authority has been terminated.14

As stated in Restatement

(Second) of Agency, § 129:
Unless otherwise agreed, if the agent properly begins to deal
with a third person and the principal has notice of this, the
apparent authority to conduct the transaction is not
terminated by the termination of the agent's authority by a
cause other than incapacity or impossibility, unless the
third person has notice of it.
See also, Sorenson v. Shupe Bros. Co., 517 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1974) (holding the acts of the apparent agent binding on
the principal as against a third party who had no notice of the
termination of agency as a result of the sale of the business).
None of the evidence in the record of this case at the time the
motion for summary judgment was re-noticed indicated that Mountain
Bell had notice of the termination of Bentley's agency.

Indeed,

the Williams affidavit confirmed the agency, where Williams
testified that Frank Trunzo told him that the Trunzo Company would
conduct the October 10, 1987 auction and that no sale of assets
would take place until after that auction (R. 151-52).

Under

those circumstances, Williams' knowledge that a sale of assets was
contemplated cannot imply notice of termination of the agency.

14

The case quoted by Old Republic actually strengthens this
position. In Walker Bank and Trust Company v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73
(Utah 1983), the court upheld summary judgment in favor of the
bank, even though the defendant put the bank on notice that her
husband was no longer authorized to use her credit card.
16

Finally, Old Republic argues that the question of apparent
authority is not appropriate for summary judgment.

The cases

cited by Old Republic to support its contention are not
applicable, because a factual issue had been properly raised in
those cases. While Bailev v. Ness, 708 P.2d 900, 903 (Idaho 1985)
correctly states that apparent authority is generally a question
for the trier of fact "where the existence of agency is disputed"
(emphasis added), another case cited by Old Republic illustrates
that summary judgment on the issue of apparent authority is
appropriate where the opposing party does not properly raise a
genuine issue of material fact.

Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones,

672 P.2d at 73.
The record properly before the court conclusively establishes
that Bentley had actual and apparent authority to act on behalf of
the Trunzo Company.

Mountain Bell was never given notice that

Bentley might not have such authority on October 10, 1987. In
fact, Williams was impliedly assured by Bentley and Trunzo that
Bentley's authority would continue through the auction of the
Mountain Bell equipment.

Mountain Bell adequately established its

right to summary judgment on the state of the record at the time
it submitted its motion for decision.

17

II.

OLD REPUBLIC FAILED TO CREATE A GENUINE ISSUE
OF MATERIAL FACT ON THE QUESTION OF BENTLEY'S
AGENCY.

A.

Old Republic was not entitled to relv solely on its
denial of Mountain Bell/s request for admissions to
defeat the motion for summary judgment.

Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, bv affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(emphasis added)

At the time Mountain Bell submitted its motion

for summary judgment for decision, Old Republic had filed no
opposing affidavits, but relied solely on its denial of Mountain
Bell's requests for admission relating to Bentley's agency.15
However, the rule does not specify denials of requests for
admission in its enumeration of items the court may consider on a
motion for summary judgment.

Rule 56(c) lists "pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any" as the materials the court
is to consider in reviewing a motion for summary judgment.

Rule

56(e) further provides that "[t]he court may permit affidavits to
be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits." Nowhere does the rule
permit a party to rely solely on denials of requests for
admission.

Cf. Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979)

X:D

Old Republic never filed its response to Mountain Bell's
Request for Admissions, so it is not part of the record on appeal.
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(opponent may not rely on denials of pleadings to avoid summary
judgment.)

Therefore, Old Republic's first memorandum in

opposition to Mountain Bell's motion for summary judgment did not
properly oppose the motion.
Old Republic also failed to file any counter-affidavit prior
to the time that Mountain Bell originally submitted the motion for
decision, nor did it do so prior to the time that Mountain Bell
re-noticed its motion for decision.

The Utah Supreme Court has

frequently upheld summary judgment in similar cases where a party
opposing the motion fails to file timely, proper affidavits.

For

example, in Briaham Truck & Implement Co. v. Fridal, 746 P.2d 1171
(Utah 1987), the court affirmed a summary judgment for a
deficiency after sale of repossessed property, where the plaintiff
submitted an affidavit describing the manner of sale, and the
defendant filed no counter-affidavit to show that the sale was
commercially unreasonable.

After observing that it "was incumbent

upon defendant to adduce whatever material defenses he had to the
entry of a deficiency judgment as a matter of law," the court
concluded: "However, bare contentions, unsupported by any
specifications of facts in support thereof, raise no material
questions of fact.
(Utah 1980)."

Massev v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937

746 P.2d at 1173.

In Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Company, 659
P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983), the court affirmed a summary judgment in
favor of a seller on a real estate contract, holding lienholders'
interests to be subordinate.

In that case, the seller filed
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affidavits setting forth the terms of the contract, the
circumstances of default, and the relative priorities of the
lienholders, but the defendants filed no opposing affidavits.
After rejecting the defendants' claims that the plaintiff's
affidavits were defective, the court stated:
The opponent of the motion, once a prima facie case for
summary judgment has been made, must file responsive
affidavits raising factual issues, or risk the trial court's
conclusion that there are no factual issues. . . Thus, when
a party opposes a properly supported motion for summary
judgment and fails to file any responsive affidavits or other
evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 56(e), the trial court
may properly conclude that there are no genuine issues of
fact unless the face of the movant's affidavit affirmatively
discloses the existence of such an issue. Without such a
showing, the Court need only decide whether, on the basis of
the applicable law, the moving party is entitled to judgment.
659 P.2d at 1044. See also, Cowen and Company v. Atlas Stock
Transfer Company, 695 P.2d 109, 113-14 (Utah 1984).
In Transamerica Title Insurance Company v. United Resources,
Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 (1970), the court affirmed a
summary judgment granting full faith and credit to an Arizona
judgment, rejecting defendant's argument that the assertion of
lack of jurisdiction in its answer was sufficient to raise a
question of fact precluding summary judgment.

The court also

noted that the defendant had not provided any factual information
in response to the plaintiff's specific interrogatory asking for
the basis of defendant's contention of no jurisdiction.

In the

present case, Mountain Bell submitted interrogatories to Old
Republic which requested Old Republic to state the basis for any
denials of Mountain Bell's requests for admission (Interrog. #1),
and to state the basis for its denial of paragraph 8 of the
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Complaint, which alleged that Bentley was the Trunzo Company's
agent in conducting the auction (Interrog. # 16) (R. 126, 129).
Additionally, Mountain Bell's interrogatories 17 and 18
specifically queried as follows:
17. Do you claim that Bentley was not the authorized agent
for Trunzo with respect to any of the facts alleged in
plaintiff's Complaint? If so, state the basis for such a
claim.
18. Do you claim that Bentley, although an
for Trunzo, did not act within the scope of
with respect to any of the facts alleged in
Complaint? If so, state the basis for such

authorized agent
his authority
plaintiff's
a claim.

Not only did Old Republic not object to these interrogatories, as
did the defendant in Transamerica. but it filed no response
whatsoever.

Under these circumstances, the court may and should

properly conclude that there was no evidential support for Old
Republic's claim of lack of agency at the time Mountain Bell
submitted the motion for decision.
B.

Old Republic's second memorandum and affidavits in
response to Mountain Bell's motion for summary
judgment were untimely•

Rule 4.501(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration states,
"[t]he responding party shall file and serve upon all parties
within ten (10) days after service of a motion, but no later than
five (5) days before the date of hearing, a statement answering
points and authorities and counter-affidavits.''16

Old Republic

did not file any affidavits in opposition to Mountain Bell's

lb

Rule 4-501(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration
superseded Rule 2.8(b) of the Rules of Practice on October 30,
1988. Although Mountain Bell cited to Rule 2.8(b) in its motion
to strike, the substance of both rules is identical.
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motion for summary judgment until forty days after the motion was
filed.17

Old Republic could not justify its delay in filing its

affidavits, because all of the events reported in the affidavits
occurred long before Mountain Bell filed its motion for summary
judgment, and no explanation was given for the delay in procuring
the affidavits.

Old Republic did not move for leave to submit

untimely affidavits, and Mountain Bell promptly moved to strike
them.
In Marcus Daly Memorial Hospital Corporation v. Borkoski, 624
P.2d 997 (Mont. 1981), the court affirmed a summary judgment,
rejecting the opponent's argument that the trial court erred in
refusing to accept and consider his untimely affidavits and brief
filed in opposition to the summary judgment motion.

The court

stated:
The purchaser offered no compelling excuse for his untimely
filing. When this untimely filing is considered with all the
unwarranted delays already caused by the purchaser, it is
clear that the trial court properly exercised its discretion
in refusing to consider the affidavit.
Id. at 1000.

In the present case, Old Republic has not offered

17

Mountain Bell's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on
November 17, 1988. Old Republic filed its first memorandum
opposing the motion, without any affidavits, on November 29, 1988.
Mountain Bell's Renewed Request to Submit Motion for Summary
Judgment for Decision, filed on or about December 12, 1988, does
not constitute the filing of a new motion for summary judgment,
but rather a request to submit the original motion for summary
judgment for decision. Even it were considered a new motion for
summary judgment, Old Republic still failed to file its second
memorandum in opposition within the 10 day period, but waited
until December 27, 1988, which was the first date on which it
filed opposing affidavits, some 40 days after the motion for
summary judgment was filed and 15 days after Mountain Bell renoticed the motion.
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any excuse, much less a compelling one, for its untimely filing.
Under these circumstances, the trial court was well within its
discretion to refuse Old Republic's untimely affidavits.18
Old Republic cites Merrill v. Cache Valley Dairy Association,
750 P.2d 539, 540 (Utah 1988), which states that on appeal the
court can only "sustain judgment if no issues of material fact
which could affect the outcome can be discerned."

Old Republic

neglects to point out that on appeal the court can only consider
the record that was properly before the trial court.

In Pinckley

v. Dr. Francisco Galleaos, M.D., P.A., 740 S.W.2d 529, 532
(Tex.App. 1987), the court held that because the record did not
affirmatively show acceptance of late filed affidavits by the
trial court, it must presume non-acceptance.

The court also

stated:
It is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
refuse to consider appellant's opposing affidavits which were
not timely filed. . . . Because the appellant's
controverting affidavits were not before the court, appellant
cannot thereby raise fact issues on appeal to defeat the
summary judgment.
Id. at 532.

Since Old Republic's affidavits were not timely

filed, this court must presume that the trial court properly
rejected them.19
18

Old Republic has not even claimed on appeal that the trial
court erred in not accepting its tardy affidavits, but rather
assumes without discussion that the affidavits were properly
before the court.
19

"If, on a motion for summary judgment, an opposing party
fails to move to strike defective affidavits, he is deemed to have
waived his opposition to whatever evidentiary defects may exist."
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Company. 659 P.2d
1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). Mountain Bell did not waive its
23

C.

Even if considered, the affidavit of Harold
Petersen does not create a genuine issue of
material fact on the question of Bentlev#s agency.

Old Republic argues that the statements of Frank Trunzo,
reported in the affidavit of Harold Petersen, to the effect that
Bentley was not an authorized agent of the Trunzo Company at the
time of the auction, should be construed as admissions by a partyopponent, under Rule 801(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Old

Republic's reliance on that rule is misplaced.
Rule 801(d)(2) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it
is "offered against a party and is (A) his own statement, in
either his individual or a representative capacity . . . .»
(emphasis added).

The fundamental requirement of this rule is

that the statement must be offered against the declarant's
interest.

"It is only when the admission is offered against the

party who made it that it comes within the exception to the
hearsay rule for admissions of a party opponent."

C. Wright & A.

Miller, 8 Federal Practice & Procedure § 2264, at 741 (1970).

The

statement of Frank Trunzo tends to exonerate both the Trunzo
Company and Old Republic from any liability.

It is conspicuously

self-serving and does not constitute an admission by a partyopponent, because it was offered against Mountain Bell, not
against the declarant.
The cases cited by Old Republic affirm the adverse interest
opposition to Old Republic's affidavits, because it immediately
filed a motion to strike them as untimely and not containing
admissible evidence. Old Republic, on the other hand, waived any
objections it may have had to Mountain Bell's affidavits, because
it neither moved to strike nor filed an objection to them.
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requirement of an admission by a party-opponent.

In Kekua v.

Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 601 P.2d 364, 370 (Hawaii 1979), the
court distinguishes a party admission from a statement against
interest.

"[P]arty admissions, unlike statements against

interests, need not have been against the declarant's interest
when made . . . ."

Id.

(emphasis added)

Although a party

admission need not be against the party when uttered, the rule
explicitly requires that it must ultimately be offered against his
interest before it can be introduced as evidence.
Old Republic's quotation regarding out-of-court statements is
also a distortion.

In Jolley v. Clav. 646 P.2d 413, 417 (Id.

1982), the court explains that "out-of-court statements of parties
to litigation are admissible in evidence against the party."
(emphasis added).

The Kekua court also clearly explains that

"extrajudicial statements of a party-opponent, when offered
against the same, are universally deemed admissible at trial ...."
601 P.2d at 371 (emphasis added).

Because the statement of Frank

Trunzo is not an admission by a party-opponent, it is no more than
simple, inadmissible hearsay.

Therefore, it fails the requirement

of Rule 56(e) that affidavits set forth "such facts as would be
admissible in evidence."

Hence it does not create a genuine issue

of material fact on the question of Bentley's agency and is
insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

See McCarthy v. Yempuku.

678 P.2d 11, 17 (Hawaii App. 1984).
Even if Frank Trunzo's statement were otherwise admissible,
the trial court properly disregarded it because it contradicted
25

the judicial admission of the Trunzo Company that Bentley was its
agent with respect to the October 10, 1987 auction.

Rule 36

admissions "conclusively" establish the matter requested, and
cannot be circumvented by other evidence, unless leave is first
obtained to withdraw or amend the admission.

See W.W. & W.B.

Gardner v. Park West Village Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977).

In

Gardner, the court held that an affidavit denying agency, which
was filed three days before the hearing on a motion for summary
judgment, was insufficient to create an issue of fact, where
deemed admissions established the agency and no motion was made to
withdraw the admissions.
In the present case, no effort was ever made by any defendant
to withdraw the Trunzo Company#s deemed admissions.

The

gratuitous, self-serving, out-of-court statement by its president,
made after default judgment had already been entered against it,
and reported by the attorney for the bonding company that is
seeking to hold him personally liable for its obligation (R. 5760), does not have any indicia of trustworthiness (see Rule
804(5), Utah R. Evid.) and should not be allowed to avoid the
effects of Rule 36(b).

Therefore, Harold Peterson's affidavit is

insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to defeat
Mountain Bell's motion for summary judgment.
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III. OLD REPUBLIC DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR APPLICATION OF RULE 56(f), UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
The trial court properly refused to apply Rule 56(f) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to deny summary judgment.

Rule

56(f) provides:
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from
the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits
to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just.
(emphasis added).

Rule 56(f) is only applicable when an opposing

party raises by affidavit reasons for his inability to oppose a
motion by affidavit.

Old Republic failed to file any such

affidavit, either before, during, or after the hearing on Mountain
Bell/s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Its sole basis for the

request to apply Rule 56(f) was its attorney's statement at the
hearing:
We have not been able to locate Mr. Trunzo since the
interview with Mr. Peterson. We have tried. We had an
address and telephone for him in Pittsburgh.
Tr. 17. This statement, as well as the affidavit of Harold
Peterson, shows that, in fact, Old Republic had been in direct
contact with Frank Trunzo as early as May of 1988 (some six months
before Mountain Bell filed its motion for summary judgment), when
he was interviewed in Old Republic's attorney's office.

Old

Republic missed a golden opportunity to obtain an affidavit or
deposition from Frank Trunzo at that time.

Old Republic's

attorneys should have recognized that since default judgment had
27

already been entered against the Trunzo Company, there was no
incentive for Frank Trunzo to remain in the state or to make
himself available for further discovery or the trial.

Old

Republic has offered no explanation why it did not obtain the
sworn testimony of Frank Trunzo when it had the chance, either by
affidavit or by deposition.
The case cited by Old Republic concerning Rule 56(f) is
distinguishable.

In Crutchfield v. Hart, 630 P.2d 124 (Hawaii

App. 1981) the appellate court reversed the lower court's grant of
summary judgment for the defendant because the time for discovery
in that case was relatively short, the plaintiff had not yet
completed discovery, and the plaintiff had asked the court for
additional time to conduct discovery.

In the present case, there

was ample time for discovery, and Old Republic had apparently
completed its discovery three months before Mountain Bell filed
its motion for summary judgment.

In Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn,

Inc.. 110 Utah Adv. Rep 53 (Utah App., filed June 9, 1989), this
court affirmed a summary judgment under similar circumstances,
where the opponent had not filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit, but
claimed she had not been permitted to complete discovery.

In that

case, the court noted that the opponent had not conducted any
discovery during the six months prior to the motion.

See also.

Jackson v. Lavton City. 743 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1987) (court
refused to consider an argument that additional discovery was
necessary where no Rule 56(f) affidavit was filed); Reeves v.
Geicry Pharmaceutical. Inc.. 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah App. 1988);
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Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 P.2d 838, 840-42 (Utah App.
1987).

In the present case, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in refusing the oral request of Old Republic under Rule
56(f), unsupported by any affidavit.

CONCLUSION
Mountain Bell requests that the Utah Court of Appeals affirm
the district court's summary judgment in favor of Mountain Bell.
The evidence properly before the court established Bentley's
agency, and hence Mountain Bell's right to judgment as a matter of
law.

Old Republic failed to create a genuine issue of fact, both

by failing to file opposing affidavits timely, and by relying on
inadmissible evidence in its tardy affidavits.

The trial judge's

decision was proper on the record and well within the bounds of
his judicial discretion, and should not be disturbed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of June, 1989.
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY

By^y^x/>6wfe^^^
Floyd^A. Jensen, Attorney
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ADDENDA

Rule 36, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Affidavit of Walter Williams Without
Exhibits and Supplemental Affidavit of
Walter Williams
Affidavit of Harold L. Petersen
Judgment

ADDENDUM A

Rule 36, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 36

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 36. Request for admission.
(a) Request for admission. A party may serve upon any other party a
written request for the admission, for purpose of the pending action only, of
the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request
that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact,
including the genuineness of any documents described in the request. The
request for admission shall contain a notice advising the party to whom the
request is made that, pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted unless said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the
request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow. Copies of
documents shall be served with the request unless they have been or are
otherwise furnished or made available for inspection and copying. The request
may, without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement
of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the summons
and complaint upon that party.
Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set
forth. The matter is admitted unless, within thirty days after service of the
request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the
party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the
admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by
the party or by his attorney, but, unless the court shortens the time, a defendant shall not be required to serve answers or objections before the expiration
of 45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon him. If objection
is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The answer shall specifically
deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party
cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the
substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a
party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny
the remainder. An answering party may not give lack of information or
knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has
made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny. A party who
considers that a matter of which an admission has been requested presents a
genuine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; he
may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or set forth
reasons why he cannot admit or deny it.
The party who has requested the admissions may move to determine the
sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless the court determines that an
objection is justified, it shall order that an answer be served. If the court
determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule,
it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be
served. The court may, in lieu of these orders, determine that final disposition
of the request be made at a pretrial conference or at a designated time prior to
trial. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred
in relation to the motion.
(b) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment
when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby
and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense
on the merits. Any admission made by a party under this rule is for the
purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission by him for any
other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other proceeding.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)

ADDENDUM B

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 56

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
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Affidavit of Walter Williams Without
Exhibits and Supplemental Affidavit of
Walter Williams
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FLOYD A. JENSEN, Esq. (Bar # 1672)
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 237-6409
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
fdba MOUNTAIN BELL
v.
GARY L. BENTLEY, an individual
and dba BENTLEY INTERNATIONAL;
S.F. TRUNZO AUCTIONEERS, INC.,
a Utah corporation; and THE OLD
REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil No. C88-534
AFFIDAVIT OF
WALTER J. WILLIAMS
HON. DAVID S. YOUNG

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Walter J. Williams, being first duly sworn, deposes and
says:
1.

I am and at all times material to this action was

employed by U S West Business Resources, Inc., fka U S West
Materiel Resources, Inc. ("U S West MRI"), an affiliate of
Plaintiff The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Company, fdba Mountain Bell, in the position of Manager Reclamation.

My duties as such included the supervision of

disposal of certain personal property of Mountain Bell under
a contract between Mountain Bell and U S West MRI.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts stated

herein, and am competent to testify thereto.

i

. vV

4...

3.

Mountain Bell and S.F. Trunzo Antiques and Auctions,

Inc. (hereinafter "Trunzo") entered into a contract for
auctioneer services on about September 6, 1982. A copy of
the contract is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," and will be
referred to hereinafter as the "Trunzo Contract."

S.F.

Trunzo Antiques and Auctions, Inc. later changed its name to
"S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc."

(See Exhibit "B" attached

hereto, which is a certified copy of the records on file with
the Utah Secretary of State's office relating to the
corporation.)
4.

In my position with U S West MRI, I was responsible

for, and therefore actually did, administer the Trunzo
Contract on behalf of Mountain Bell.
5.

The Trunzo Contract remained in full force and

effect through at least October 10, 1982, and was the only
source of authority under which Trunzo was permitted to
auction personal property of Mountain Bell during that
period.

Mountain Bell did not use or employ any other

auctioneer of its personal property in Utah during that
period.
6.

To satisfy the security requirements of the Trunzo

Contract, Trunzo furnished a bond to Mountain Bell.
7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true copy of a

bond executed by Frank Trunzo on behalf of Trunzo, and by
Myrel G. Mitchell, as attorney in fact for the surety, Old

-2-

Republic Insurance Company, to provide security to Mountain
Bell for Trunzo's performance under the Trunzo Contract.
8.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true copy of a

bond executed by Gary L. Bentley on behalf of Trunzo, and by
Myrel G. Mitchell, as attorney in fact for the surety, Old
Republic Insurance Company, to provide security to Mountain
Bell for Trunzo's performance under the Trunzo Contract.
9.

As far as I knew and understood, Gary L. Bentley was

an officer and agent of Trunzo, and in all transactions and
arrangements involving the auction of Mountain Bell property,
I always dealt with him in his capacity as such.
10.

During the summer and early fall of 1987, I

requested Gary L. Bentley, representing Trunzo, to pick up
several vehicles and items of equipment belonging to Mountain
Bell and to auction the same pursuant to the Trunzo Contract.
Representatives of Trunzo did pick up the specified vehicles
and equipment.

For each item received, an authorized

representative of Trunzo was required to sign a document
entitled "Receipt of Vehicles and Equipment for Auction," a
sample copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "E."
11.

Pursuant to the Trunzo Contract, I arranged with

Gary L. Bentley, representing Trunzo, for the vehicles and
equipment to be auctioned by Trunzo on October 10, 1987.
12.

In the weeks preceding the October 10, 1987

auction, Frank Trunzo and Gary Bentley informed me that the
assets of Trunzo would be sold to Bentley International after
-3-

V.

the auction was held.

Both Frank Trunzo and Gary Bentley

repeatedly assured me that the auction would be conducted by
Trunzo and that no sale or disposition of Trunzo's assets
would occur until after the auction.
13.

The auction of Mountain Bell vehicles and equipment

was held on October 10, 1987, on the premises of Trunzo at
388 Hartwell Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah.

At all times

during the auction, a sign hung above the auction yard
reading "S. F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc."
14.

I attended the auction on October 10, 1987. I

observed both Frank Trunzo and Gary Bentley auctioning the
Mountain Bell vehicles and equipment.
15.

Neither Mountain Bell nor U S West MRI received any

proceeds from the October 10, 1987 auction within seven
working days after the auction, as required by t 3.D of the
Trunzo Contract.
16.

I made many verbal demands on Trunzo, through its

representative Gary L. Bentley, to remit the proceeds of the
auction of October 10, 1987.

Gary L. Bentley assured me on

several occasions that the proceeds would be paid shortly.
17.

On or about October 29, 1987, I received a check

for $47,705.64, representing the proceeds of the auction of
October 10, 1987 after deducting the commission due Trunzo
under the Trunzo Contract.

The check was drawn on an account

in the name of "Bentley International," and was signed by
Gary L. Bentley.

The check was dishonored upon presentment,
-4-

marked "Insufficient Funds/' and was returned to me,

A copy

of the check is attached hereto as Exhibit "F."
19.

To date, the check attached as Exhibit "F" has not

been made good, nor has any payment of any part of the
proceeds of the auction of October 10, 1987 been received by
Mountain Bell or U S West MRI.
Further Affiant saith not.
DATED this

day of November, 1988.

A'JhJ AJLMJ

Walter(3. Williams
.
1/1*
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
/i?^"
day of
November, 1987.
fy
(~ \ ~

Notary Public residing in Salt
Lake County, UtatvO
My commission expires:

>£// 0 HP
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Affidavit of Walter J. Williams was mailed, postage
pre^id, to the following on the f l day of A//7V~,
Harold L. Petersen, Esq.
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Old Republic Insurance Company
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
S. F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc.
3 88 West Hartwell Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Gary L. Bentley dba
Bentley International aka
Bentley International Auction Company
3 88 West hartwell Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
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FLOYD A. JENSEN, Esq. (Bar # 1672)
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 237-6409
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
fdba MOUNTAIN BELL
v.
GARY L. BENTLEY, an individual
and dba BENTLEY INTERNATIONAL;
S.F. TRUNZO AUCTIONEERS, INC.,
a Utah corporation; and THE OLD
REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation

Civil No. C88-534
SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT OF
WALTER J._WILLIAMS
HON. DAVID S. YOUNG

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Walter J. Williams, being first duly sworn, deposes and
says:
1.

I am and at all times material to this action was

employed by U S West Business Resources, Inc., fka U S West
Materiel Resources, Inc. ("U S West MRI"), an affiliate of
Plaintiff The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Company, fdba Mountain Bell, in the position of Manager Reclamation.

My duties as such included the supervision of

disposal of certain personal property of Mountain Bell under
a contract between Mountain Bell and U S West MRI.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts stated

herein, and am competent to testify thereto.

:> 1333

3.

I previously signed an affidavit herein, entitled

"Affidavit of Walter J. Williams." The purpose of this
affidavit is to supplement the statements made in that
affidavit, relative to my knowledge and observations of the
relationship between Gary L. Bentley and S.F. Trunzo
Auctioneers, Inc. (hereinafter "Trunzo"), with which company
Mountain Bell had a contract for auctioneer services, as
detailed in my previous affidavit.
4.

Commencing in September 1984, Gary L. Bentley was

the principal point of contact between Mountain Bell and
Trunzo with respect to all auctions conducted by Trunzo for
Mountain Bell pursuant to the Trunzo Contract, as defined in
my previous affidavit.

I personally dealt with Bentley with

respect to arrangements for and conduct ot each of such
auctions, and Bentley always appeared to be in charge of each
such auction.

He personally picked up items to be auctioned

or directed other employees of Trunzo to do so, executed
receipts for such items, and arranged for advertisements and
other publicity for the auctions.
proceeds of such auctions to me.

He also delivered the net
In addition, with respect

to at least the last two auctions, he arranged for the
accounting and record keeping with respect to the auction
sales.
5.

Gary L. Bentley told me on several occasions that he

was the Vice President of Trunzo, and I believed him to be
such.
-2-

6.

Auctions of Mountain Bell property by Trunzo were

held on the following days, resulting in net proceeds to
Mountain Bell as indicated.

In each instance, Gary L.

Bentley was the representative of Trunzo who arranged for the
auction as described in Paragraph 4 hereof, the auction was
held at Trunzo's property at 388 West Hartwell Ave., Salt
Lake City, Utah, and the revenue was paid over to Mountain
Bell by means of checks drawn on Trunzo's bank account (with
the exception of the last auction).
Auction Date

Net Proceeds of Sale

Sept. 15, 1984

$ 118,776.18

Feb. 16, 1985

$ 56,785.62

June 15, 1985

$ 14,713.25

Oct. 9, 1985

$ 25,541.50

Nov. 16, 1985

$ 19,794.50

Mar. 26, 1986

$ 14,306.67

Aug. 9, 1986

$ 49,665.09

Dec. 16, 1986

$ 55,132.42

June 4, 1987

$ 15,522.18

Oct. 10, 1987
7.

($ 47,705.64)

Throughout the period indicated in the previous

paragraph, I also met on numerous occasions with Frank
Trunzo, the president of Trunzo, who told me that Bentley was
the Vice President of Trunzo.

Frank Trunzo never indicated

that Bentley was not authorized to arrange auctions for

-3-

Trunzo, although he obviously knew that Bentley was doing so,
at least with respect to Mountain Bell property.
Further Affiant saith not.
DATED this

/

day of December, 1988.

alter [/J. Williams
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
December, 198$.

/

day of

Notary Public residing in Salt
Lake County, Utah
My commission expires:

-4-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Supplemental Affidavit of Walter J. Williams was
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following on the ?*aay oJ
December, 1988:
Joseph J. Joyce, Esq.
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Old Republic Insurance Company
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
S. F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc.
388 West HartweZl Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Gary L. Bentley dba
Bentley International aka
Bentley International Auction Company
388 West hartwell Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
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Affidavit of Harold L. Petersen
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Joseph J. Joyce, #4857
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Old Republic Insurance Co.
Sixth Floor Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

t »

C ?un

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
dba MOUNTAIN BELL,

AFFIDAVIT OF HAROLD L. PETERSEN

Plaintiff,
vs.
GARY L. BENTLEY, an individual
and dba BENTLEY INTERNATIONAL;
S.F. TRUNZO AUCTIONEERS, INC.,
a Utah corporation; and THE OLD
REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,

Civil No.

C88-534

Judge David S. Young

Defendants.

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA )
COUNTY OF

fehJUtO

)

HAROLD L. PETERSEN, being first duly sworn, deposes
and says:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the

states of Utah and Virginia.
2.

Up until July of 1987, I was the attorney of record

in this matter for defendant The Old Republic Insurance Company.

I was employed at the law firm of Strong & Hanni and was the
attorney primarily responsible for the defense of The Old Republic
Insurance Company.
3.

I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein,

and am competent to testify thereto.
4.

On or about May 17, 1988, I interviewed Frank Trunzo

personally in my offices at Strong & Hanni in Salt Lake City.
The interview was tape recorded and a transcript of the interview
was prepared.
5.

During said interview, Mr. Trunzo told me of the

sale of S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers to Gary Bentley.

Mr. Trunzo

further told me that following the sale of the S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers,
Inc. assets to Bentley, Bentley was not authorized to act as
an agent for S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers.
6.

Mr. Trunzo also told me that he had informed Walter

Williams on more than one occasion that Mr. Trunzo was selling
his business to Gary Bentley and further that Bentley was solely responsible for the October 10, 1987, auction where Mountain Bellfs
equipment was allegedly auctioned.
Further affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this ^£A

day of December, 1988.

ClIcgpid^L . ^ e i ( e r sen
S u b s c r i b e d and sworn t o b e f o r e me t h i s &3d)'— day of

December, 1988.

Notary Pub$/1# - R e s i d i n g a t :

My Commission E x p i r e s :

- £ , K ^ , " * . * , "^o o < W

is

y±£Uired.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was mailed, first class postage prepaid, this
23rd day of December, 1988, to the following:
Floyd A. Jensen, Esq.
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
S. F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc.
P. 0. Box 520082
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152
Gary L. Bentley dba
Bentley International aka
Bentley International Auction Company
388 West Hartwell Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

Wendy HQ Smart; Secretary

ADDENDUM E

Judgment

Thira Judicial District

FEB

6 1989

D

FLOYD A. JENSEN, Attorney Bar #1672
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 237-6409

TLflKECCUNTl
TY
Deputy Clark

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND
TELEGRAPH COMPANY, dba MOUNTAIN BELL,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C88-534

GARY L. BENTLEY, an individual and
dba BENTLEY INTERNATIONAL; S. F.
TRUNZO AUCTIONEERS, INC., a Utah
corporation and THE OLD REPUBLIC
INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation,

HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG

£\^bb^

Defendants.

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff be awarded Judgment against said
defendant THE OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY in the amount of:
$45,000.00 - Principal
f$ y £f(*l.& - Accrued prejudgment interest from
—;
to date of Judgment
$

Dec (3f !*i£7

93.75 - Accrued costs to date of Judgment

$ gO 0%,V> - TOTAL JUDGMENT,
with interest on the total Judgment at twelve percent (12%) per
annum as provided by law from the date of this Judgment until

^

t~

r>*.

-

(-1

paid, plus after-accruing costs.
DATED t h i s _ j 2 _ d a y of &&&rfY, U2/89.
BY THE COURT:

David S. Yo
District C
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVEPY
I hereby certify that on this 7 ?
day of January, 1989, I
caused to be hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment to:
Joseph J. Joyce, Esq.
Strong & Hanni
Attorneys for Defendant
Old Republic Insurance Company
Sixth Floor, Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this Z-3
day of January, 1989, I
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Judgment by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to:
Gary L. Bentley &
dba Bentley International
P.O. Box 201077
Salt Lake City, Utah 84120

Frank Trunzo
S. F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc,
388 Hartwell Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 841115

